Abstract I present a model of conformism in social networks that incorporates both peer effects and self-selection. I show that conformism has positive social value and that social welfare can be bounded by network polarization and connectivity measures. I apply the model to empirical data on high school students' participation in extracurricular activities. I find that the local effect of conformism (i.e. the endogenous peer effect for a fixed network structure) ranges from 7.5% to 45%, depending on the number of peers that an individual has. Simulations show that the optimal policies of an inequality-averse policymaker change depending on a school's enrollment. Small schools should encourage shy students to interact more with other students, while large schools should focus on promoting role models within the school.
Introduction
Do teenagers smoke because their friends smoke, or do they smoke in hopes of making new friends? Does peer pressure come from influence or self-selection?
The literature on peer effects in social networks has mainly focused on influence, while the literature on network formation has focused on self-selection. To date, these two sources of social interactions have mainly been studied separately.
In this paper, I present a model of conformism in social networks, where both influence and self-selection affect behavior. The magnitude of each effect can be clearly identified because changes to an individual's peer group induce discontinuous changes in the individual's behavior, while changes in how an individual's peers behave (holding constant who an individual chooses as his peers) induces continuous changes in an individual's behavior. I characterize the set of all (Nash) equilibria and present an equilibrium refinement (perfect and robust) based on the potential function of the game. I estimate the model using student-level data on participation in high school extracurricular activities, as well as on students' friendship networks.
I show that, for a social planer with quadratic preferences, equilibria can be ranked according to the variance of equilibrium behavior and that conformism has a positive social value. I also show that the optimal policy results from a trade-off between connectivity and polarization. A social planer who wants to prevent the emergence of bad (i.e. high-variance) equilibria should promote integration and ensure that no group of individuals is isolated from the rest of the network. A social planer who wants to support the emergence of good (i.e. lowvariance) equilibria should focus on promoting role models. A comprehensive public policy should thus consider both polarization and connectivity. I characterize the relationship between individual behavior and the network structure for all equilibria of the game. For any equilibrium, peer effects depend on the number of peers an individual has, and cannot be derived solely from the average behavior of an individual's peers. As a result, the overall impact of conformism on the outcome variable increases with the number of peers an in-dividual has, with each marginal peer having less impact than the previous one.
A specific feature of the model is the high degree of unobserved heterogeneity allowed. Accordingly, and due to self-selection, the model cannot be represented as a random exponential graph, which contrasts with the recent literature on empirical network formation.
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The focus on self-selection is new to the empirical literature on peer effects in social network.
2 In most of the literature, the endogeneity of the social network results from the presence of a fixed variable, observed by the individuals in the model, but unobserved by the econometrician. This variable is assumed to affect the individuals' behavior as well as the network formation process, thus creating endogeneity.
3 Since the unobserved variable is unaffected by the individuals' choices, this has no equilibrium implication. Self-selection however has important equilibrium implications coming from the interplay between (1) the choice of the behaviors given the network, and (2) the choice of the network given the behaviors.
I apply the model empirically using data on high school students' extracurricular activities. 4 Although it is not feasible to estimate the true model, I
provide bounds for the density of the equilibrium network; each bound can be interpreted as a latent space model (see, for example, Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens (2013) ). In practice, the bounds lead to roughly the same estimated parameters. Depending on the number of peers that a student has, the local impact of conformism (that is, the endogenous peer effect for a given network structure) ranges from 7.5% to 45%. Using simulations, I show that the cost of increasing connectivity increases with the size of a school, while the potential benefit decreases. This suggests that small schools should focus on connectivity, whereas large schools should focus on polarization.
1 e.g. Badev (2013) , Chandrasekhar & Jackson (2014) and Mele (2015) . See Appendix C for a formal discussion.
2 A notable exception is Badev (2013) , see section 2 for a discussion. 3 e.g. Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens (2013) , Hsieh & Lee (2014) and Patacchini & Rainone (2014) . See section 2 for more details.
4 Such activities include chess clubs and sport teams, for example.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review the related literature. In section 3, I present a microeconomic model where individuals simultaneously choose their behavior and their peer groups. In section 4, I present an empirical application using data on student participation in extracurricular activities. I conclude in section 5.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to various aspects of the literature on social networks, which I will discuss individually.
I contribute to the literature on conformism in social networks. I focus on quadratic preferences, as in Bisin et al. (2006) , Bisin &Özgür (2012) and Patacchini & Zenou (2012) . I follow Bisin et al. (2006) and Bisin &Özgür (2012) by assuming that the value of a link between two individuals is decreasing in the distance between their behavior. While Bisin et al. (2006) and Bisin & Ozgür (2012) present dynamic theoretical models for fixed network structures,
I present a static model of conformism, allowing for self-selection. Patacchini & Zenou (2012) also focus on quadratic preferences and present an empirical application, which assumes that the network is exogenous. They assume that individuals conform with the average behavior of their peers. This implies that the influence of conformism is the same, regardless of the number of peers they have. I present a model of conformism allowing for self-selection where the influence of conformism grows with the number of peers an individual has.
This paper also contributes to the theoretical literature featuring games in endogenous networks. Hojman & Szeidl (2006) present a model where individuals simultaneously choose their behavior and the agents that they link with within a network. They find, for large enough populations with mostly homogeneous agents, that the equilibrium network is minimally connected. 5 Herman (2013) and Kinateder & Merlino (2014) focus on the provision of local public 5 For some specifications, they also find that the equilibrium network is a wheel.
goods. Baetz (2015) presents a model of strategic complementarities and finds that any (strict) equilibrium is a multipartite network. An extreme version of the model presented in this paper has a similar intuition (see proposition 7). König et al. (2014) also present a model of complementarities based on an homogeous version of Ballester et al. (2006) , where the optimal behavior for a Mele (2015) , Chandrasekhar (2015) and Boucher & Mourifié (2015) ). As in most of those papers, the model in this paper suffers from the "curse of dimensionality," since the strategy space grows exponentially with the number of individuals. 6 Mele (2015) develops a two-step MetropolisHastings algorithm in order to compute the posterior distribution for his model. Chandrasekhar & Jackson (2014) use the set of sufficient statistics for random exponential graphs in order to reduce the computing time. Boucher & Mourifié (2015) and Leung (2013) use mixing random fields to achieve consistent estimation. Most of the literature focusses on random exponential graphs. Since the model developed in this paper is not a random exponential graph (see Appendix C for a formal discussion), the techniques found in the literature cannot be directly applied. I circumvent the computational problem by providing easily computable bounds for the equilibrium network, while allowing for a wide variety of unobserved heterogeneity. In practice, these bounds are tight enough 6 The number of possible network structures for a population of n individuals is 2 n(n−1)/2 . to infer the model's parameters.
This paper also contributes to the large literature on peer effects (e.g. Blume et al. (2015) , Bramoullé et al. (2009 ), Gaviria & Raphael (2001 , and Sacerdote (2001)). 7 Most of the literature focuses on the model usually referred to as "linear-in-mean," where an individual's behavior is affected by his peer group's average. The measured impacts of peer effects vary substantially across studies, from non-existent to more than 90% (see for example the discussion in Sacerdote (2011), Table 4 .2, for peer effects on academic achievement). I present a model where the magnitude of peer effects changes as a function of the number of peers an individual has. I find a peer effect coefficient for teenagers' involvement in extracurricular activities ranging from 7.5% to 45% which represents, on average, an impact of the peer-group average of 15.5%.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the recent empirical literature on peer effects in endogenous networks. As mentioned in the introduction, most papers (e.g. Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens (2013) , Hsieh & Lee (2014 ), Patacchini & Rainone (2014 and Qu & Lee (2015) ) present models where endogeneity is due to the presence of a fixed, unobserved variable. That is, there exists a variable, unaffected by individuals' decisions, which is observed by individuals in the model but not by an econometrician. This unobserved variable is assumed to affect the choice of behavior as well as the choice of the network, which creates endogeneity. As in Badev (2013) , this paper looks at a different source of endogeneity: individuals' abilities to self-select into the social network. This difference is important since it implies that the choice of behaviors and the network are intrinsically linked, which has important equilibrium implications.
Interestingly, the literature mostly finds that estimated peer effects, 8 controlling for the endogeneity of the network, are similar to when the network is assumed to be exogenous. However, as noted by Badev (2013) looking at a model of complementarities, Badev (2013) finds that ignoring the network formation process leads to biases (from 10% to 15%) on the predicted impact of public policies. Policy shocks affecting the network structure will have an impact on equilibrium behaviors, and vice-versa. I contribute this literature by providing a model of conformism with self-selection. I also provide additional insights as to why the network formation process does not substantially bias the estimated impact of peer effects for the Add Health database, and discuss the implications of this finding for policymaking.
The Microeconomic Model
The economy is composed of n individuals. 9 Individuals simultaneously make two decisions: their behavior (y i ∈ R) and their choice of peers (g i ∈ {0, 1} n−1 ). I assume that individuals have preferences for conformism:
where λ ≥ 0, z ij = z ji is a vector of pair-specific characteristics, 11 and x i is a vector of individual characteristics. The distributions of the unobserved shocks ε i and η ij = η ji are left free for the moment, but distributional assumptions will be made in section 4. Individuals incur a cost if they choose a behavior y i that is different than their type (i.e. x i β + ε i ), and different than their peers' behavior, y j . However, individuals gain from forming connections with peers that provide a net positive value. Since the value of a link is multiplied by g ij g ji , a link is only created under mutual consent, i.e. g ij = g ji = 1.
Note that if there are no social interactions (i.e. λ = 0), individuals' utilities
2 and the optimal behavior for each individual is given by y i = x i β −ε i . Similarly, a link is created 9 Since I consider a game of perfect information, one should think of n as being relatively small. For example, the economy considered could represent schools or neighborhoods. The model is ill-suited to large populations, such as a major city or a country.
10 The preferences are similar to the instantaneous utility of Bisin &Özgür (2012).
11 The model can be extended to non-symmetric z ij .
only if z ij δ + η ij ≥ 0. However, if λ > 0, the utility function is not separable in (y i , g i ), so the optimal decision for y i is a function of g i , and vice-versa.
The model induces a strategic-form game Γ = N, {S i } i∈N , {u i } i∈N , where
Let us first consider the optimal choice of g, given y. Intuitively, individuals should choose g i such that they keep links with a positive value and discard links with a negative value. If this holds true, the utility function reduces to:
This assumes that individuals play as if every link with positive value is created.
shows that the set of equilibria ofΓ is a subset of the equilibria of Γ.
Proposition 1. If y * is a NE ofΓ, then there exists g * such that (y * , g * ) is a NE of Γ.
Proposition 1 is convenient as it reduces the dimensionality of the problem.
Note, however, that proposition 1 does not imply that any equilibrium of Γ can be found from the resolution ofΓ. This is because the specification in (1) implicitly solves for the bilateral coordination problem: if i does not invest in a link with j (i.e. g ij = 0), then j has no incentive to invest in the link, even if the value of the link is positive. This observation has motivated the introduction of equilibrium refinements allowing for bilateral deviations such as pairwise stability (Jackson & Wolinsky, 1996) and bilateral equilibria (Goyal & Vega-Redondo, 2007) .
In what follows, I concentrate on the analysis ofΓ, and hence implicitly assume that every link with positive value is created.
12 Note that from proposition 1, any equilibrium of the modified gameΓ is an equilibrium of the original game Γ.
A small technical issue with the function in (1) is that it is not differentiable everywhere. However, the next lemma shows that w i (y) is locally differentiable around its maxima, and that there exists a generically unique maximum.
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Lemma 2. Let y * i ∈ arg max yi w i (y i , y −i ). Then, for all j = i, we generically have that
Moreover, y * i exists and is generically unique.
Lemma 2 says that individuals never maximize at a "kink" in the utility function. The intuition is as follows: if i and j are linked, the choice of y i is affected by y j . Hence, i chooses a different behavior when he is linked with j than when he is not. The value of their link must outweigh the cost of conforming with j. If the link has no value, i would be better off removing the link with j and re-optimizing without j as a peer.
Lemma 2 implies that the utility functions are differentiable around their maxima, so that it is possible to write the first-order conditions of the optimization problem. This property is at the source of the identification strategy, as it allows us to capture the effect of marginally changing the value of y, keeping g constant. This allows for a local analysis of the model that looks at peer effects within a fixed network structure.
Local Analysis
From lemma 2, we can write the first-order conditions for the maximum of w i (y), evaluated at the equilibrium (y * , g * ). Doing so reveals a closed-form relation between y * and the Laplacian matrix of the equilibrium graph. The
Laplacian matrix L = D − G is obtained from the adjacency matrix G and the 12 This is a standard assumption in the empirical literature on network formation. See, for example, Christakis et al. (2010) and Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens (2013) .
13 In this paper, "generically" refers to results that are robust to small changes in η, or equivalently to the fact that the set of values of η for which the proposition does not hold has a null Lebesgue measure.
diagonal degree matrix D, where G ij = 1 if i and j are linked, and G ij = 0 otherwise, and where D ii = j G ij . Let E(a i ) and V ar(a i ) be the mean and variance across individuals for any variable a. We have the following:
Moreover, y * is such that:
Note that proposition 3 holds for any equilibrium of the original game Γ.
Note also that the closed-form expression is always well defined, since the Laplacian matrix is positive semi-definite, so (I + λL * ) is positive definite for any positive λ and hence invertible. Since L * represents the choice of g * , this expression gives an equilibrium relationship between the optimal choice of y and g.
Points 1 and 2 of proposition 3 are direct implications of the closed-form expression. They characterize the effect of conformism on the distribution of behavior. The average behavior is equal to the average individual's type in the population, while the variance of behaviors is always smaller. Note that these features are implied by the conformism game for a given network, and
are not a result of the network formation process. Also note that the first point of proposition 3 implies the absence of a network multiplier for uniform policy shocks. This feature of the conformism game is also found in Patacchini & Zenou (2012) and Liu et al. (2014) , and is discussed in Boucher & Fortin (2015) . Finally, note that it implies that the model can be estimated using within-group deviations (see section 4).
Proposition 3 has important implications, since the reduced-form expression allows for the specification of a quasi-likelihood function (see section 4).
However, greater intuition can be obtained by studying the individual best responses, as they facilitate the comparison with existing models of conformism.
y j be the average behavior of i's peers, where n i = j G ij is the number of peers that i has. Assuming that individuals have at least one peer, we have:
Equation (2) follows from proposition 3, while equation (3) is the model of Patacchini & Zenou (2012) , rewritten in terms of this paper's notation.
14 For both models, the optimal choice represents a convex combination of an individual's type and the average behavior of his peers. 15 Model (2) differs from model (3) mainly by the fact that the number of peers has an impact on the trade-off between the individual's type and the behavior of his peers. If n i = 1 for all i, the two models are equivalents.
In Patacchini & Zenou (2012) , individuals conform with the average behaviour of their peers, regardless of the number of peers an individual has. In (2), as i gains additional peers, he puts less weight on his type and more weight on the behavior of his peers. Therefore, individuals with more peers are more prone to be influenced by their peers. Note, however, that the marginal impact of an additional peer decreases in the number of peers that an individual has.
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Although it is true that, at the limit, the contribution of individual characteristics goes to zero as the number of peers goes to infinity (or when λ goes to infinity), one has to keep in mind that this holds only for the equilibrium network, which is itself a function of behavior. I discuss these equilibrium effects in section 3.2.2 (see proposition 7).
14 Equation (3) is in fact a special case of the Patacchini & Zenou (2012) model, which is described in equation (6) on p. 10 of that paper. Appendix B of this paper also contains an interpretation of the Patacchini & Zenou (2012) model in terms of the (random walk) Laplacian matrix of the network.
15 Note that for λ > 0, the weight associated with the average behavior of an individual's peers is always strictly between 0 and 1 for both models, so the model is "stationary" in the sense that the sequence of best-response functions converges to a fixed point. 16 In a sense, model (2) contains features of both the "local average" and "local aggregate" models from Liu et al. (2014) . Individuals are conforming with the average (local average), but the number of peers is also important (local aggregate).
I now discuss the implications of points 1 and 2 of proposition 3. Consider the following social welfare function:
where I assume that b < 0, so the social planer is inequality-averse with respect to behavior. This implies that the social planer would like to implement PigouDalton transfers (Marshall et al., 2010) .
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Consider the following example. Suppose that y represents drinking behavior (e.g. quantity of alcohol consumed). Given that the total amount of alcohol consumed is fixed (see point 1 of proposition 3), how should the social planer distribute consumption? An inequality-averse social planer would prefer to reduce the consumption of heavy drinkers, at the expense of increasing the consumption of non-drinkers. In essence, an inequality-averse social planer dislikes extreme behavior.
Since preferences are quadratic and all the equilibria have the same mean (see point 1 of proposition 3), the equilibria can be ranked according to their variance. Point 2 of proposition 3 thus implies that any equilibrium of the game is preferred to a case where there would be no social interactions (i.e. when λ = 0). Put differently, conformism has a social value.
Since the equilibrium distribution of y strongly depends on the distribution of individuals' types, the equilibrium distribution of behaviors cannot simply be expressed as a function of generic network statistics. For example, networks with more links do not necessarily have lower variances of equilibrium behaviors.
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What matters is which links are created. For example, an increase in links decreases the variance. Specifically:
Proposition 4. Consider two network structures G and G such that G is generated by adding links to G . Then,
Proposition 4 implies that adding links is socially beneficial, but does not describe which links should, from an efficiency perspective, be added first, or which links would lead to a larger decrease in the equilibrium variance.
To study these issues, I present two bounds for the equilibrium variance.
These bounds depend on two network features: the edge connectivity, and the polarization level. The edge connectivity of g (denoted by e(g)) is equal to the minimal number of links in g that need to be removed in order to disconnect the network. The polarization level is formally defined as
where
. Note that for a given degree distribution, C * is large when there exists a pair of individuals (say (i, j)) that has relatively few links (i.e. n i + n j is small), while having a large number of second-degree links (i.e. k∈Ni n k + k∈Nj n k is large). This tends to happen in highly polarized network structures such as star networks. In a star network, any link is a "center-periphery" link. The central individual has n i = (n − 1) links, while an individual on the periphery has n j = 1 link.
However, that link is to the central individual so indirect links, for individuals on the periphery, are numerous: k∈Nj n k = (n − 1). Then, for the star network,
In contrast, C * will tend to be small for Proposition 5 (Dispersion). Let (y * , g * ) ∈ S be a NE of Γ and t i = x i β +ε i . Then, we have: 
Connectivity Polarization
Consider an inequality-averse social planner -in this case, a high school principal. As discussed above, conformism does not affect the average behavior in the school. However, it does reduce extreme behavior by reducing the equilibrium variance.
In order to decrease the lower bound of the equilibrium variance, the school's principal should try to polarize the equilibrium network. This is essentially the key player argument (Ballester et al. (2006) ) in the context of endogenous networks: promoting strong role models improves access to equilibrium outcomes with low variance. In practice, policies such as organizing sports teams or tournaments may generate such role models. However, this does not guarantee that the equilibrium variance will be low, as the upper bound can be quite high.
In order to prevent bad equilibria, the school's principal should increase the edge connectivity of the graph. Note that if the network is disconnected, the edge connectivity is equal to zero and the upper-bound on the equilibrium variance is not binding. In order to decrease this upper bound, the principal should link isolated individuals and groups (for example, the principal could encourage shy students to participate in a team activity where they can make new friends and become better integrated with the rest of the student body).
Put differently, a society composed of many segregated groups may result in equilibria with high variances.
Proposition 5 clearly illustrates the trade-off between promoting centrality and connectivity, as well as the implications that they have for the variance of equilibrium behavior. However, recall that this section's analysis is conditional on the equilibrium network structure and therefore only holds locally. I now study the full model.
Global Analysis

Existence and Potential Function
In order to develop an intuition of the shape of the best-response functions inΓ, I start by describing an example of a best-response function in a twodimensional space. Figure 2 displays an example of a best-response function for i ∈ N in the space (y i , y j ) (that is, keeping y k constant for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}). When y j is small, i and j are not linked and small changes in y j do not affect the value of y i . However, as y j increases, there is a point where it becomes profitable for i and j to form a link. The link creation has a downward discontinuous effect on y i (since y j < y 0 ). When y i and y j are such that i and j are linked, y i reacts linearly to a change in y j (with a slope of λ 1+λni < 1, where n i is the number of peers that i has; see proposition 3). Note that the changes in the slope and the jumps are due to the creation or removal of links with the n − 2 other individuals. As y j increases further, there is a point where a link between i and j is no longer profitable, such that y i goes back to y 0 and is no longer affected by small changes in y j .
The n-dimensional best-response function follows the same intuition. This is problematic for existence (of a Nash equilibrium), as none of the standard fixed-point theorems apply. However,Γ is a "potential game" (Monderer & Shapley, 1996) .
21 A potential game has a function ψ(y) such that for all i ∈ N , and any y i , y i , we have ψ(
In the case ofΓ, a valid potential function is the following:
Although the potential function bears a strong resemblance to the utilitarian social welfare function, the maximum of the potential function will not, in gen-
21
The crucial assumption for the initial game Γ that allows for the existence of a potential function is the mutual consent assumption, i.e. the fact that the value of the link is multiplied by g ij g ji . eral, be socially optimal. This is due to network externalities. Note that the double summation in (7) counts every link only once. In contrast, the utilitarian social welfare would count every link twice, since it appears in the utilities of both individuals involved.
22 It turns out that this difference is important and that the maxima of the potential and welfare functions will generally be different (see the Appendix D for more details).
In fact, the maximum of a potential function is a NE (Monderer & Shapley, 1996) . Hence, the existence of an (inefficient) NE forΓ (and for Γ) follows directly from the next proposition:
Proposition 6 (Potential function's maximum). The potential function ψ(y) has a generically unique maximum y * .
Since the maximum of the potential function is (generically) unique, it also exhibits robustness properties. I will discuss two of these properties: trembling-22 Specifically, the utilitarian welfare function is given by:
hand perfection (Carbonell-Nicolau & McLean (2014) Network games have complex requirements for individual rationality, as individuals have to simultaneously choose the network structure and their action.
Due to the high dimensionality of the strategy space and the potentially large number of players, the likelihood that individuals make small, uncorrelated, mistakes while playing the game is high. Since the maximum of the potential function is trembling-hand perfect, it is robust to such small mistakes.
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Also note that Γ is a game with complete information. This contrasts with part of the literature on social interactions (e.g. Blume et al. (2015) ). In an economy where individuals are not ex-ante connected in a network, it seems unlikely that all of the individuals' characteristics are common knowledge.
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Since the maximum of the potential function is robust to canonical elaborations, it is robust to the incorporation of a small amount of imperfect information, i.e. the maximum of the potential function would still be a (Bayesian-Nash) equilibrium if, with high probability, individuals' (private) types are such that their preferences are given by (1).
I now discuss further the properties of the equilibrium network.
Shape of the Equilibrium Network
Since the model allows for a wide variety of observed and unobserved heterogeneity, it is impossible to precisely characterize the equilibrium network structure. However, it is possible to gain some insights by analyzing the shape Proposition 7 (Asymptotic Behaviour). When λ → ∞, 1) any equilibrium ofΓ is such that y * i = y * j for all i, j in the same network component, and 2) the maximum of the potential function is such that
When λ goes to infinity, conformism is very high. Individuals will either choose to have no peers (and choose y i = x i β + ε i ), or choose exactly the same behavior as their peers. However, the particular behavior is left unspecified.
Given that every individual within a given component has the same behavior, no individual has an incentive to deviate, regardless of the value of the behavior chosen.
The maximum of the potential function imposes more structure on the equilibrium behavior and acts as a coordination mechanism. Since 1 2 (y i −x i β−ε i ) 2 is convex in y i , the potential is maximized by averaging across individuals' types.
That being said, even when λ → ∞, finding the maximum of the potential function is non-trivial, as it is not concave. Alternatively, note that one could use proposition 3 in order to rewrite the potential as a function of the network.
Since we know y * for a given network structure, the problem of maximizing the potential function can be thought of as choosing the "best" network structure (see proposition 8). As discussed in the introduction, maximizing such a discrete optimization problem is extremely complex, and has been the source of recent contributions to the literature on empirical models of network formation (e.g. Boucher & Mourifié (2015) , Chandrasekhar & Jackson (2014) and Mele (2015) ).
It is possible to circumvent this problem by focusing on bounds for the maximum of the potential function. I discuss the main benefits of using this approach below. We have the following:
, where y(G) is given by proposition 3. Then, max y φ(y) = max G φ(G) and the following bounds hold for all G:
Suppose that, conditional on the equilibrium value for y * , we want to find the network structure that maximizes the potential function, i.e. find arg max G φ(G).
As mentioned above, this is computationally difficult.
The bounds in proposition 8, however, are easy to maximize. Intuitively, the first bound underestimates the cost of creating a link by abstracting from the cost imposed by y on the value of the links. The opposite is true for the upper bound, where the approximation overestimates the cost of creating a link by only considering first-order effects. Note that the tightness of the bounds is decreasing with the number of links in G. Hence, they are better suited to relatively sparse networks.
The bounds in proposition 8 will be useful in estimating the model.
Peer Effects and Extracurricular Activities
In this section, I apply the model to conformism in high school students' choices of extracurricular activities. This specific context is well adapted to the model as teenagers are more likely to (1) participate in an activity if their friends do too (Bramoullé et al., 2009) , and (2) create new friendships while participating in these activities (Dworkin et al., 2003 ). I focus on the level of involvement in extracurricular activities, as measured by the number of extracurricular activities in which students are involved.
The level of involvement in leisure/extracurricular activities is an important factor in the cognitive and social development of individuals (e.g. Mahoney & Stattin (2000)), especially for "structured" activities such as those offered at (Dworkin et al., 2003) . For example, Larson (2000) finds that extracurricular activities help to develop teenagers' "capacity for initiative." This effect is observed regardless of the type of activity (e.g. arts, sports, etc.). Following proposition 3, and since 1 is an eigenvector of L, the model can be estimated using within-group deviations. Letỹ r = (I − 1 nr 11 )y r andX r = (I − 1 nr 11 )X r for each school r = 1, ..., R of size n r , and define M r (λ) = (I + λL r ). I start by describing the choice ofỹ for a fixed network structure. Following proposition 3 and in the spirit of Lee et al. (2010) , I define the following quasi-25 This approach has also been used by Bramoullé et al. (2009) .
maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) forỹ, given a fixed network structure:
The identification of β, σ ε and λ, given G, follows from standard results for linear models (see Blume et al. (2015) or Lee et al. (2010) ).
In order to estimate the full model, P (ỹ, G|X, Z), one needs to compute the density of the network, P (G|X, Z). As described in section 3.2.2, the model does not necessarily have a unique equilibrium network. This is problematic since games with multiple equilibria may result in incoherent estimators (e.g. Tamer (2003)). Some innovative techniques have been recently proposed and applied to address this issue (e.g. Galichon & Henry (2011) ), but they unfortunately cannot be applied here. In order to define a coherent estimator, I assume that the data is generated by the (unique) equilibrium that maximizes the potential function.
Assumption 1 (Equilibrium Selection). Any observed equilibrium (y * , g * ) is such that: y * = arg max ψ(y).
In practice, assumption 1 requires that one is able to compute y * = arg max y∈Y ψ(y).
As noted in the previous sections, the potential function is not globally concave, which makes its maximization infeasible in practice. I therefore use the bounds defined in proposition 8 to approximate the model. Specifically, I generate two networks based on the maximization of the two bounds:
I estimate the full approximated models using both specifications. I assume that z ij = −|x i − x j | and that η ij ∼ N (0, σ 2 η ). Note that P (G 0 |X, Z) is a simple (scale-identified) probit model. The speci-fication for P (G 1 |X, Z) has to be simulated, since it does not allow for a closedform density.
26 Also note that P (G 1 |X, Z) allows for the identification of δ/σ ε and λ/σ η , so together with (10), all the parameters of the model are identified.
Note that the network G 1 effectively carries the intuition for the endogeneity of the model: ε affects both the network formation process and the choice of behavior. Finally, note that both networks can be thought as "latent space" models (e.g. Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens (2013) , Graham (2015) ). 
Results
As an initial benchmark, coefficients for both specifications are very similar, as are the log-likelihood values. As noted in the introduction, the small bias due to the endogeneity of the network is consistent with the literature. Looking at the marginal effects in table 3, this should not be surprising. Although statistically significant, the contribution of individual characteristics on the probability of a link is extremely small. In this particular database, the bias created by the endogeneity of the network is also small. 
2 , so the additional contribution of z i is not significant.
The estimated values for the main parameter of interest, ln(λ), are −2.5204 and −2.5149 for G 0 and G 1 , respectively. This leads to values of λ of 8.04%
and 8.08%. However, as discussed above, the magnitude of peer effects depends on the number of friends an individual has. Recall that:
Figure 3 displays the distribution of the implied peer effects using the observed distribution of the number of peers (i.e. λ 1+λni , using λ = 8.08%). The impact of a change in one peer's behavior ranges from 4.5% (for an individual with 10 peers) to 7.5% (for an individual with only one peer). Put differently, when choosing the number of activities to participate in, a student with only one friend puts a weight of 92.5% on his individual characteristics (i.e. his type), while a student with 10 friends puts a weight of only 55% on his individual characteristics (i.e. 1 1+λni , using λ = 8.08%). only holds for non-isolated individuals, the average for λn i 1+λn i = 0.1541 is also computed over non-isolated individuals. N (0, 1)) 
The Utilitarian Welfare
In order to give an idea of the inefficiencies found in equilibrium, and as a prelude to the discussion on policy implications in the next section, I provide some simulations for the optimal utilitarian welfare criterion.
As described in Appendix D, the source of inefficiencies mostly comes from the fact that, conditional on a given network structure, an utilitarian social planner would choose a more concentrated distribution of behaviors.
29 Figure   6 shows the link between the observed behaviors and the behaviors that would have been choosen by the utilitarian criterion, assuming that the observed network is efficient.
As discussed in details in Appendix D, the utilitarian social planner would prefer a lower variance of behaviors. Accordingly, he would choose to reduce the involvement in extracurricular activities for teenagers with a high level of participation, while increasing the involvement for teenagers with lower level of participation.
I now further describe the implications of this section's results for policymaking. Utilitarian optimal behavior as a function of the observed behavior, conditional on the observed network. Computations using estimated value for λ in Table 5 . The variables are expressed in deviations with respect to the school average to allow the comparison across schools. Points on the 45 degree line represent isolated individuals.
Implications for Public Policy
In this section, I discuss various policy implications of the model, using teenagers' involvement in extracurricular activities as an illustration. Since the model features both peer effects and self-selection, this suggests that a policymaker can affect an equilibrium through two different channels: by using the shape of the network, or by affecting the shape of the network. This shows that conformism has an important impact on the choice of behaviors, and that it strongly affects the value of a friendship. Since the average value of a friendship is small, the likelihood that a policy can affect behavior, without affecting the network structure, is small. That is, a policy may destroy links, which has a negative impact on welfare (see proposition 4).
Moreover, even if the policymaker was able to implement a small shock that would affect the choice of behavior without affecting the network, the role of conformism is likely to be small since the measured impact of peer effect (i.e. I first look at a policymaker's ability to decrease the upper bound. In order to increase the edge connectivity, a policymaker would have to connect the Averages, across schools, for the lower-bound, the variance of behavior (V ar(y i )) and the variance of types V ar(x i β + ε i )). Expected value for the lower bound using 1,000 draws.
network. 30 Figure 9 shows how many links would have to be added to the network, as a function of the school size. We see that for large schools, this number can be quite high.
Since the number of links to be added is higher for larger schools, the cost of adding these links is also likely to be high. Figure 9 shows the relative gain from connecting the network. 31 We see that the impact is quite small, and decreasing in a school's enrollment. This suggests that, for small schools, policymakers may focus on promoting integration, although for large schools, policymakers should primarily focus on promoting role models.
Conclusion
I present a model of conformism featuring both peer effects and self-selection.
I find that the network structure and equilibrium behaviors are linked through 30 That is, the policymaker would need to create enough links so that the network has only one component.
31 Formally, Figure 10 shows the relative decrease in the upper bound, as a percentage. the Laplacian matrix of the network. This particular relationship implies that the number of peers influences the magnitude of peer effects. Moreover, social welfare can be bounded by the centrality and edge connectivity of the equilibrium network.
Using the theoretical predictions of the model, I measure the impact of conformism on student participation in extracurricular activities. I find that the magnitude of endogenous peer effects ranges from 7.5% to 45% depending on the number of peers an individual has. Results indicate that, while small schools can focus on promoting integration, large schools should focus on creating role models. Relative change in the value of the upper-bound (in %) as a function of the school's enrollment.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof (of Proposition 1). Let g * be such that g *
Proof (of Lemma 2).
Step 1:
Consider y i that maximizes the utility w i . Note that for all the ij such that z ij δ + η ij < 0, any y i leads to the same value for the link, as the maximum is equal to 0. The case where z ij δ + η ij = 0 is non-generic. Now, consider
. It helps to define the following sets:
We also define the following directional derivatives:
where t i = x i β + ε i . It is easy to see that y * i maximizes w i (y i , y −i ) only if ∂ + (y i ) ≤ 0 and ∂ − (y i ) ≥ 0 or, equivalently, if:
These two conditions can be met simultaneously only if
since individuals in C i (y) appear in both summations. Now, note that any j ∈Ã i (y) is such that y i − y j = − 2υij λ , and any j ∈B i (y) is such that y i − y j = 2υij λ . Thus, it is required that
Step 2: The maximum exists and is generically unique.
Existence follows from the fact that any y i < min{y j , t i } or y i > max{y j , t i } is dominated by some y i ∈ [min{y j , t i }, max{y j , t i }]. Now, suppose that two maxima exist: y i and y i . From step 1, this implies that y i and y i do not induce the same network structure, i.e. there exists j such that
Then, taking a small perturbation of η ij , the first-order conditions still hold for y i and y i , but they no longer yield the same utility.
Proof (of Proposition 3).
Step 1: y = [I + λL] −1 [Xβ + ε] Let (g * , y * ) be a NE of Γ. Since the strategy space for y i is unbounded and any NE is interior for y i (from lemma 2), the first-order conditions must apply. At g * , for all i ∈ N , the following holds: 0 = j:g * ij =g * ji =1 −λ(y i − y j ) − y i + x i β + ε i , which is equivalent to y i = −λn * i y i + j:g * ij =g * ji =1 λy j + x i β + ε i . In matrix form, we have:
Defining L = D − G, which is positive semi-definite (Godsil & Royle (2013) ), we have:
Step 2: E(y * i ) = E(x i β + ε i ) Note that 1 is the eigenvector of L associated with eigenvalue 0, so
Step 3: V ar(y * i ) ≤ V ar(x i β + ε i ) We have V ar(y i ) = 1 n y y−E(y i ) 2 . By adding and subtracting E[(x i β+ε i ) 2 ], we have:
which, from step 2 above, is equivalent to:
Rewriting, we have:
where [(I + λL) −2 − I] is negative semi-definite.
Proof (of Proposition 4). We have V ar(y i ) = 1 n y y − E(y i ) 2 , which from point 1 of proposition 3, is equal to V ar(y i ) = 1 n y y − E(x i β + ε i ) 2 , or:
Note that for any vector w, we have the following equality:
Consider the Laplacian matrices L and L , where L is obtained from L by adding links. We therefore have: L ≥ L (in the sense of definiteness). This in turn implies that (I + λL) −2 ≤ (I + λL ) −2 , which completes the proof.
Proof (of Proposition 5). Let 0 = ξ 1 ≤ ... ≤ ξ n be the eigenvalues of L. Using the expression for the variance of behavior in the proof of proposition 4 and applying the spectral theorem, we have:
where T is orthonormal and U(a i ) is a diagonal matrix with entries a 1 , ..., a n . The first bound is then obtained by using (see Newman (2000) , theorem 1.5.4):
For the second bound, consider the expression for the variance in step 3 of proposition 3:
Again, applying the spectral theorem, we have:
where U i (a i ) is a matrix taking value a i at position (i, i), and 0 elsewhere.
and recalling that t 1 = 1/ √ n is the normalized eigenvector associated with eigenvalue 0, we have:
Using the fact (see Newman (2000) , theorem 1.3.11) that
we simply substitute for the value ofâ, noting thatâ + 1 = 1 (1+λξi) 2 , and apply the bound for ξ 2 . This completes the proof.
Proof (of Proposition 6). I now show that the potential function has a generically unique maximum.
Let t i = x i β + ε i . Without a loss of generality, assume that t 1 ≤ ... ≤ t n . It is sufficient to show that any y is (weakly) dominated by some y * such that
Consider y and a non-empty
For any y, we can write ψ(y) as (setting empty sums to 0):
which is maximized forȳ l =
Appendix B: Linear-in-Mean
As described in section 3.1, the best-response function for an individual with at least one peer is given by:
whereas, for an isolated individual (or when λ = 0), the best response is given by:
LetD be a diagonal matrix taking a value ofD ii = 1 if i has at least one peer, and 0 otherwise. Also letG be the normalized adjacency matrix, such that
With some algebra, we find that the unique NE is given by:
which bears a strong resemblance to the expression in proposition 3. In fact, theL =D −G is sometimes called the random-walk Laplacian matrix. Note that if all individuals have at least one peer, we haveD = I and the expression reduces to:
9. Appendix C: Random Exponential Graphs and Stochastically Stable Equilibria
In this section, I compare the approach of this paper with models based on random exponential graphs. Most of this analysis borrows heavily from Ui (1997).
I show the following:
1. Random exponential graph models (as in Badev (2013 ), Chandrasekhar & Jackson (2014 and Mele (2015) ) can be viewed as the equilibrium distributions of a simple quantal response game where the only source of unobserved heterogeneity comes from the independent and identically distributed mistakes made by the agents in choosing their peers.
2. As noise vanishes, the random exponential graph model selects the potential maximum with probability 1.
Consider the utility function for individuals, where I let ε i = η ij = 0 for all i, j:
Consider y as being fixed for the moment. As described in the text, an individual's best response inΓ is to choose g ij = 1 if and only if z ij δ − λ 2 (y i − y j ) 2 ≥ 0. I will denote the best-response for i as B i (g −i , y), given g −i and y. Suppose that individuals make mistakes when choosing their optimal strategy, in the spirit of quantal response games (QRG) (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995) . In a QRG, individuals maximize random payoffs or, equivalently, make random mistakes while maximizing.
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Consider the following evolutionary process. For t = 0, ..., define individuals' random utility as u t i (g, y; ) = u i (g, y) + (g i , τ ). I assume that (g i , τ ) follows τ f (τ e) and that f is a type I extreme value, independent and identically distributed across i and t. At each period, one player is randomly chosen, with probability 1/n, to update his strategy. This model can therefore be represented by a (discrete and irreducible) Markov chain {g t (τ )} ∞ t=0 with the transition probability given by: (see Ui (1997) )
(1/n)P τ [g For potential games, Ui (1997) show that the stationary distribution of a QRG is given by:
which is a (not necessarily linear) random exponential graph model (e.g. Badev (2013), Chandrasekhar & Jackson (2014) and Mele (2015) ), and wherê
is the potential function of the game.
Note that one could extend this model by including unobserved heterogeneity (as in section 3, using ε i and η ij ). In that case, g would have a compound distribution given by the mixture of (12) with the distributions of ε i and η ij .
The resulting distribution will not, in general, have a closed-form expression (and will not be a random exponential graph model).
Interestingly, as τ goes to infinity, the random exponential graph model selects the maximum of the potential function. A network g is said to be stochastically stable (Young, 1993) if lim τ →∞ π τ (g, y) > 0. The next result follows:
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Proposition 9. Let G * = arg max hP (h, y) be the (non-empty) set of equilibrium networks. A network g is stochastically stable iff g ∈ G * . Moreover, for all g ∈ G * , lim τ →∞ π τ (g, y) = 1/|G * |.
This implies that, as the scaling parameter τ goes to infinity, the Markov process converges to one of the maxima of the potential function with certainty.
Finally, note that if we assume that individuals are able to correctly update their behavior given the network structure, we may substitute y = [I + 33 See Young (1993) for a more general treatment.
λL] −1 [Xβ] in (12) so that the limit distribution for g no longer depends on y, while still being a random exponential graph.
This analysis implies that (12) can be extended to the model presented in this paper by (1) introducing unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. ε i and η ij ), and (2) letting τ → ∞.
Proof (of Proposition 9). Rewrite the stationary distribution as: π τ (g, y) = 1 1 + h =g exp{τ [P (h, y) −P (g, y)]} .
We have lim τ →∞ exp{τ [P (h, y) −P (g, y)]} = ∞ whenP (h, y) −P (g, y) > 0, while lim τ →∞ exp{τ [P (h, y)−P (g, y)]} = 0 whenP (h, y)−P (g, y) < 0. Finally, forP (h, y) −P (g, y) = 0, we have exp{τ [P (h, y) −P (g, y)]} = 1 for all τ , so the equality also holds at the limit by continuity. Then, if g / ∈ G * , lim τ →∞ h =g exp{τ [P (h, y)−P (g, y)]} = ∞, so lim τ →∞ π τ (g) = 0. If g ∈ G * , the denominator of π τ (g) is 1 + (|G * | − 1) + h / ∈G * exp{τ [P (h, y) −P (g, y)]} which is equal to |G * | as τ goes to infinity.
Appendix D: The Utilitarian Welfare
As described in the text, the utilitarian welfare function is given by:
Using the same argument as in proposition 3, we can compute the optimal behavior, given a fixed network structure: 
